The Wendelstein 7-X (W7-X) safety instrumented system (SIS) ensures personnel safety and investment protection. The development and implementation of the SIS are based on the international safety standard for the process industry sector, IEC 61511. The SIS is based on a distributed and hierarchically organized architecture consisting of a central safety system (cSS) on the top and many local safety systems (lSS). Each technical component or diagnostic system potentially hazardous to staff or the device is equipped with an lSS, which is responsible for the safety of the component. On the other hand, the cSS ensures safety of the W7-X device as a whole and is part of the central control system of W7-X. For every operation phase of the W7-X experiment, hardware and software updates for the SIS are mandatory. New components with additional lSS functionality and additional safety signals have to be integrated. Already established safety functions must be adapted and new safety functions have to be implemented in the cSS. Finally, the safety programs of the central and lSS have to be verified for every development stage and validated against the safety requirement specification. This paper focuses on the application of a model-based simulation system for the whole SIS of W7-X. A brief introduction into the development process of the SIS and its technical realization will be given followed by a description of the design and implementation of the SIS simulation system using the framework SIMIT (Siemens). Finally, the first operational experience of this simulation system for the preparation of the SIS for the upcoming operation phase OP 1.2b of W7-X will be discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE fusion experiment Wendelstein 7-X (W7-X) is a superconducting stellarator with a capability for steady-state plasma operation. The first operational phase of W7-X started in December 2015 [1] . Meanwhile, two operation phases have been conducted with very good results with respect to the availability and performance of the W7-X systems during the operation. Furthermore, very good experimental physics results were obtained [2] . The authors are with the Institute for Plasma Physics, 17491 Greifswald, Germany (e-mail: joerg.schacht@ipp.mpg.de).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TNS. 2019.2913797 An important aspect of W7-X device operation is the mitigation of any personnel or machine hazards. A safety instrumented system (SIS) was designed and implemented based on the EN/IEC 61511 standard for the "functional safety-SISs for the process industry sector." This standard is the most appropriate one since W7-X does not fall under the category of a nuclear plant.
The requirements on safety instrumented functions (SIFs) were derived from the safety concept for the main device and infrastructural environment as well as the risk assessments of all attached components. The functions can be separated into those addressing personnel safety and those dedicated for the protection of the investment, i.e., device safety.
Every new operation phase generates new or modified requirements on safety functions. For example, new technical or diagnostic systems have to be integrated into the W7-X control systems or the operation space will be broadened.
During the completion phases of W7-X, the SIS has to be modified. This modification comprises both the implementation of new safety signal interfaces as well as programming of new SIFs. All SIFs of an operation phase are described in a safety requirement specification. Every commissioning of W7-X requires a fully validated safety control system according to the required safety standards. Therefore, different tests and validation steps have to be performed, before the SIS is approved for the next operation phase. At the end of the improved software implementation, module tests of the individual function blocks are performed and documented, as well as the verification and documentation of sensors, actuators, and correct cabling. The final tests are the validation of the SIFs against the safety requirement specification.
Since the allocated time for a W7-X completion phase is often very short, optimization of the processes for software development and testing is mandatory. The control and data acquisition group (CoDa group) decided to use a modelbased simulation framework based on the SIMIT framework (Siemens) to support software development and for integration tests of the SIS during the commissioning phase CP2.1b.
After a short description of the SIS, the framework SIMIT and its application for the SIS of W7-X will be described. Fig. 1 shows the overall architecture of the control system, which is a three-tier hierarchical system. The safety system, which is the focus of this paper, acts on different safety layers and gives operation permits to the operations 0018-9499 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
II. ARCHITECTURE OF W7-X SIS
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. management and subsequently to the plasma control system. Regarding the architecture, it was decided to choose the same distributed control system as for operations management consisting of a star-type topology with the central safety system (cSS) as the center and the local safety systems (lSS) belonging to the components, e.g., heating systems or auxiliary systems such as the gas inlet and plasma diagnostics. The cSS is both a high availability system and a failsafe system. The used Siemens programmable logic controller (PLC) type can process SIF up to safety integrity level (SIL) 3. The safety functions for operating phase OP1.2b required a maximum of SIL 2. Table I gives an overview about the structure of the SIS software.
III. SIS SIMULATION SYSTEM
The usage of SIS simulation systems is the state of the art in the power generation industry as well as in the chemical industry. However, the application of a complete simulation and test system of the SIS for fusion experiments has not yet been described in the literature.
The following tasks are covered with such kind of simulations.
1) Examining the design of processes before commissioning a plant. 2) Performing preliminary tests of safety functions together with the approval and testing authorities. 3) Performing tests of changes to a plant or processes before they are released. 4) Training of plant personnel. 5) Presentation for customers/prospects of the plant. The model-based simulation platform SIMIT (Siemens) is engineered for the simulation of devices and complex plants [3] . The main advantages of this platform are a s follows.
1) Development and testing of automation software before commissioning. 2) Emulation of signals, device, and process levels.
3) Graphical user interface for an easy handling. 4) Utilization as operator training system. 5) Use of standard field buses for coupling the PLCs of the SIS with the simulation platform SIMIT. Using the tool SIMIT allows testing the SIS software without actually operating W7-X. SIMIT allows, in principle, two different architectures for the simulation. The first variant allows a complete emulation of both the PLC hardware of the central and all local safety controllers by using a simulation PC equipped with the SIMIT software tool. The second architectural variant (used in our project) consists of two blocks. The first block comprises the central SIS and uses the equivalent PLC hardware and software of the production system. The visualization of the cSS is identical to the production system. The second architecture block implements the local SIS of the components. This block is completely emulated by software on the simulation PC. The simulation includes all lSS of diagnostics and technical components. Furthermore, all peripherals connected directly to the cSS, e.g., control panels, the monitoring of the radiation protection area is simulated.
For our simulation project, the second variant has been chosen, because the simulation should be focused mainly on test of the software of the safety logic of the cSS. The SIS for technical components and diagnostics is separate projects, including its own tests and validations. During integration tests and for validation of the whole safety system of W7-X, the cSS and all lSS are tested and validated finally together. Depending on the test task, different software versions of the cSS can be loaded into the PLCs of the test system. The actual production SIS software version must be loaded for its failure detection, whereas new software versions of upcoming operation phases can be loaded for module and integration tests. These tests can be performed in parallel to an operating W7-X SIS without any interference. The architecture of the SIS test system is shown in Fig. 2 . The SIS software under test runs on a redundant automation system based on two fail-safe and high-reliability PLCs S7-417. Apart from network addresses, hardware and network configuration of the PLCs are identical to the one of the W7-X SIS (cSS). Thus, analyses of the real-time behavior of the test system are transferable to the behavior of the real system. Fig. 3 shows the coupling of the PLC safety program under test with the SIMIT simulation environment.
The signal transfer between the PLCs and the simulation program is done by ProfiSafe. A special simulation unit for Profibus emulates all signal connections between the PLCs and the peripheral devices of the SIS. The socalled interface planes for input and output signals enable the transfer of signals between the PLC program and the SIMIT models.
As shown in Fig. 3 , the SIMIT simulation software includes the modeled local safety components of the lSS (e.g., the power supplies of the superconducting magnets), the virtualized hardware subcomponents of the cSS (e.g., emergency stop switches, signalization, and access control system), and the supervision and operation of the SIMIT model. All can be controlled and observed via graphical operator panels. Furthermore, within SIMIT, macros can be used to automate complex control sequences of a simulation run.
IV. REALIZATION AND RESULTS
The project to setup the simulation system of the SIS was planned and was implemented according to the V-model of system engineering process. Table II gives an overview over the work packages for setting up the SIS simulation system.
In the design phase of the SIS simulation platform, all foreseen simulation models were described in a specification using SysML as a graphical modeling language [4] . In SysML, the diagram types "finite-state diagrams" and "activity diagrams" are particularly suitable for our purpose. Fig. 4 depicts a SysML finite-state model of the coil current of the superconducting magnet system. An automatic code generation for the SIMIT simulation program based on the specified SysML models is not possible. For the SIMIT implementation, program charts are used where the user can take advantage of a large library with standard control elements. In addition, a more complex and specific behavior can be captured by defining user-specific control elements. Fig. 5 shows a specific control element for the central gas warning system as an example for a userspecific control element.
For the control of simulation variables, the user can choose different standard tools of SIMIT, e.g., tables of variables for showing and modifying variables. User-defined control panels, which allow to combine graphical elements, text boxes, output of values, and placing of control elements (e.g., switches and knobs for various user inputs) offer an additional level of convenience. Fig. 6 shows a very realistic implementation of the cSS control console in SIMIT as an example for a control panel. The user can operate this panel in the same way as the real cSS control console so it is also useful for operator training.
More than 2000 input and output variables of the safety program are processed in the simulation software. Models have been prepared and implemented for all technical components and diagnostics that have a safety interface to the cSS. The simulation also models important hardware subcomponents of the cSS (e.g., the gas warning system, the access system of the radiation protection area, the emergency stop system, and the signalization).
Furthermore, for a complete simulation of the cSS behavior, the signals of actuators and sensors of important hardware subcomponents of the cSS were modeled. The hardware setup for the simulation system is segregated from the hardware of the W7-X safety system. The PLCs, the network devices, and the Profibus coupling devices are located in a dedicated electrical cabinet.
The software version of the safety program of the PLCs corresponds to the planned simulations. For the preparation of the cSS for a new operation phase, the PLC safety software development and the tests can be performed by using the combined engineering and simulation platform. Furthermore, the simulation software must be modified due to the upgrade of the established models or due to the implementation of new models. During a campaign, software on SIMIT and the SIS are identical to enable the recreation of failure scenarios and support debugging.
The workstation of the simulation platform consists of a standard PC with four screens running the simulation tool SIMIT V9.0 and the simulation software. Another four screens are used to display the WinCC visualization program of the PLCs running on virtualized hardware.
Finally, another dedicated workstation is used as an engineering station allowing modifications of the PCS-7 safety program. Fig. 7 shows all workstations for the simulation environment.
No major problems were encountered during design, installation, and commissioning of the hardware for the simulation platform. Contractor support enabled a very short development cycle for the W7-X specific models of less than 4 months.
Using the simulation platform during software development and integration tests made early detection and correction of configuration and software errors possible. This allowed an error and bug-free validation of the cSS program for OP1.2b, which was a major accomplishment.
During the operation phase OP2.1b, we used the platform both for operator training, the analysis and debugging of potential failure scenarios, and for parallel safety software development with W7-X operation.
V. CONCLUSION
W7-X has successfully concluded two operation phases. To improve the software development process and the module and integration tests, a SIMIT-based test system for the SIS was established and commissioned. It controls about 1300 failsafe input signals and 700 fail-safe output signals and includes models covering the behavior of all essential functions of the cSS and lSS. Software tests using the SIS test system were performed successfully at the end of February 2018, after completion of the SIS software development for the upcoming operation phase OP1.2b.
